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Everything we see hides another thing, we always want to see what 
is hidden by what we see. There is an interest in that which is 
hidden and which the visible does not show us. This interest can 
take the form of  a quite intense feeling, a sort of  conflict, one might 
say, between the visible that is hidden and the visible that is present.  
– René Magritte commenting on The Son of  Man 1964 
f  the dramas‑ played out during Ramadan *
in Java, the excitations the sight of  ‘beggars’ 
evokes among the good people of  the middle 
class are unmistakable. For every year it is the 
unfailing concern of  the media – as well as 
many an overheard conversation in buses, offices 
and shopping malls – that the major cities of  the 
island, and Jakarta especially, are repeatedly 
‘swamped’ by tens of  thousands of  allegedly 
‘professional beggars’ (pengemis profesional). The 
concerns expressed are multiple. Most often, 
though, they have to do with the ‘beggars’ being 
out-of-towners, basically peasants from the 
surrounding countryside, who, having made a 
habit of  pretending to be ‘destitute and 
poor’ (fakir miskin) are managing to make more 
than a decent living from the proceeds of  good 
people’s generosity. Not only are such people 
lazy and indolent, knowing nothing of  the value 
of  work, the accusations go, but they are 
essentially cunning and deceitful—defrauding 
honest people, and depriving them not only of  
their money, but also of  the prospect of  doing 
good in a meaningful way, that is in a way that 
makes a difference to worthy recipients. Given 
the level of  public anxiety, the good people of  
urban centres are evidently protected by the 
authorities in many a city, where ‘begging’ has 
been turned into a crime. In addition, they are 
repeatedly warned to avoid giving, that is giving 
in to the fake pleas for help and mercy of  street-
roaming strangers. 
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The solicitation of  goodness during 
Ramadan takes other forms as well, some of  
which have come under the scrutiny of  the 
authorities, including the religious authorities. 
An incident which marked public perceptions 
inexorably took place in 2008 in the coastal city 
of  Pasuruan, in East Java, where during the 
Ramadan month of  that year several people, all 
of  whom were women, died in a stampede. 
Their deaths were linked to the public 
distribution of  zakat, the Islamic obligatory 
wealth transfer, carried out by Haji Syaichon 
Fikri, a wealthy trader of  bird nests, leather 
products and cars. In provincial Java it is 
customary for large crowds of  destitute and 
impoverished people from the immediate 
locality and its environs to form outside the 
residences of  wealthy individuals, normally 
upon receiving notice that zakat distribution is to 
be carried out on specific dates. Fatefully, in 
September 2008, the ‘mass’ (massa) that had 
gathered outside Fikri’s house made a mad dash 
for the money, resulting in 21 women dying in 
the ensuing pandemonium, having been 
trampled by an out-of-control crowd. According 
to press reports, the ‘mass’ had grown impatient 
after having waited for hours on end for the 
distribution of  money to begin. At the same 
time, the lack of  adequate supervision by the 
family – which had not notified the police – was 
also emphasised as having played a role in the 
deaths. In the aftermath of  this tragedi, the 
Indonesian Council of  Islamic Scholars (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia) issued a fatwa, an edict that 
declared this method of  zakat distribution as 
unlawful (haram) and called for zakat transfers to 
proceed in an orderly, well-supervised, and 
controlled manner so as to avoid further loss of  
human life. 
Ethnographic vignettes such as this make 
aptly clear that giving as well as receiving are 
activities conducted in a socially approved and 
politically sanctioned manner. Because of  this, 
givers as well as recipients have to be trained in 
the acquisition of  appropriate manners, and 
should expect to have their performances 
evaluated according to standards of  behaviour 
that are historically and culturally specific. It 
may be apparent that it is Foucault (2008), and 
the arts of  governmentality, that I am 
channelling here; but it is not the conducting of  the 
conduct of  the gift-giver or of  the gift-receiver 
that I want to address. Rather it is the conducting 
of  the conduct of  anthropological description I 
want to focus on, to argue that our quandaries 
and difficulties with the gift as an analytical 
category  could be examined anew and 1
repositioned with a change of  perspective, 
which is also a change in knowing. To this end, I 
embark upon a deconstructive engagement with 
Mauss’s text (2011), together with a few 
subsequent and significant re-assessments of  the 
gift as performed in key anthropological texts. 
The purpose of  this exercise is to pick out some 
of  the elements, or dimensions, relating to value 
transfers that Mauss’ study and subsequent 
analyses have excluded, or omitted, from their 
considerations. Then, I will go on to take a 
closer look at Derrida’s (1991) own critical 
engagement with Mauss’ study in order to 
recalibrate and renew the political and 
analytical potential of  deconstruction for the 
understanding and enactment of  the social.       2
The Gift and the Given 
The impression Mauss’ study on the gift 
(2011) has made in anthropology is massive, and 
deservedly so, for no other text has unearthed 
more archaeological treasures, so to speak, with 
every new excavation that has taken place. And 
even if  Lévi-Strauss’ (1987) reading of  the gift as 
 One of  the most intriguing difficulties is the distinction between gifts and commodities. In 1982, Gregory 1
argued for the formalisation of  the distinction along the lines of  a sharply drawn dualism; however in 1997, he 
revised his previous position arguing instead for their contemporaneous existence in most societies. Similarly, 
Miller (2001) and Addo & Besnier (2008) show commodification to be an incomplete and on-going project in 
which processes of  becoming-commodity take place alongside countervailing operations of  becoming-gift.     
 Efforts at theorising the social have continued undiminished since Mauss’ original study of  the gift. Not only 2
were subsequent engagements with gift-giving geared, either explicitly or implicitly, to such ends, but more 
recently a diverse range of  perspectives – ranging from globalisation and practise theory to discourse and actor-
network theory – has furnished alternative, often contradictory, understandings of  the basic co-ordinates and 
significance of  this condition of  intense inter-involvement. My own take on the social is very much indebted to 
the philosophy of  Deleuze, as explored more fully in a separate monograph (Retsikas 2012). Here it might 
appear that I am taking a different route; however I do approach Derrida as a disciple of  Nietzsche (2003) more 
than anyone else, Heidegger included.          
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reciprocity, together with Sahlins’ (1974) 
elaborations on it, have exercised an enduring 
influence in the discipline, subsequent critical 
engagements by Bourdieu (1977), Parry (1986), 
Strathern (1988), Raheja (1988), Weiner (1992), 
Godelier (1999) and Laidlaw (2000) have carried 
our lasting fascination with ‘The Gift’  to new 
heights. This is despite the fact that there is now a 
mounting disagreement amongst commentators 
about what Mauss truly said, meant to say, and 
actually wrote. Such excitement is partly related 
to the way Mauss’ short study is organised, 
discussing complex ethnographic and historical 
materials in a distinctly cursory and preliminary 
manner, while speculating on an evolutionary 
path covering thousands of  years. At the same 
time, anthropological debates around ‘The Gift’ 
have also been linked to the book’s political 
objectives insofar as Mauss offered the gift as a 
point of  contrast to commodity production, 
conceiving it as essential to a socialist time-to-
come (Mauss 2001: 63-81).  It is perhaps 
because of  such qualities that anthropological 
fervour over the study’s significance endures, 
and the potential for novel readings remains 
undiminished. 
Having recently re-read ‘The Gift’, I have to 
admit that it was not the contractual character 
of  gift-exchange that attracted my attention. 
While there can be no doubt that reciprocity, 
with its attendant obligations, is firmly rooted in 
the basic contours of  the text, I was left cold by 
its promises, and by its presentation of  an all-
too-rosy picture of  social relationships, which 
was neither ethnographically persuasive, nor 
effective in conveying their complexity and 
ambiguity.  Leaving aside the undeniable 3
romanticism animating his project, I was also 
struck by the realisation that the all-important 
distinction Mauss sets up between gifts and 
commodities is compelling only on condition 
that we set aside the fact that they are both 
instances of  exchange and thus, require legal 
sanction to be operable. In other words, both 
gifts and commodities presuppose the 
organisation of  the social in terms of  contracts 
that, in turn, necessitate the invention and 
application of  Law. In this sense, the social 
cannot be said to derive from gift exchange, for 
 Such ambiguities are perhaps best conveyed in Raheja’s (1988) North Indian study in which gifts (dān) are held 3
to transmit inauspiciousness and misfortune around, and thus instead of  being warmly welcomed, are rather 
reluctantly accepted. 
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the gift is itself  dependent on practices of  
promising and punishing.  What is more, the 4
further I delved into the text, the more wary I 
became of  Mauss’ perspective—which 
inadvertently and consistently privileges the act 
of  giving, and the side of  the giver, even as this 
position is duly acknowledged as reversible and 
interchangeable. Specifically, the three 
obligations Mauss identifies as essential are 
arranged in an exact temporal sequence that 
begins with giving, which is followed by 
receiving, and culminates in repaying (2011: 
37-41). Here giving supersedes in importance 
both receiving and returning; the main function 
of  the latter two is to supplement giving in such 
a way that the circle is closed, and the contract 
honoured. Furthermore, the analytical primacy 
accorded to giving is attributed with moral 
valence by Mauss, who treats giving as 
synonymous with upright conduct, prescribing 
the Maori proverb ‘give as much as you receive 
and all is for the best’ to his contemporaries as a 
guide for realising true socialist ethics (2011:69).    
This notwithstanding, I found myself  
engrossed by a series of  observations Mauss 
makes about the Melanesian kula, which 
correspond to what is virtually hidden as much 
in the overall visibility organising ‘The Gift’ as in 
subsequent anthropological debates concerning 
reciprocity. In Mauss’s text, such observations 
are mostly ethnographic and have to do with the 
spells the would-be gift-receiver performs in 
advance of  his/her encounter with the would-be 
gift-giver. Some of  the theoretical issues the 
spells speak have been taken up by Beidelman 
(1989), Weiner (1992) and Graeber (2001), who 
in their own particular ways highlight the 
agonistic and competitive nature of  gift-
exchanges, and the dilemmas, deception, 
cunning and even coercion that pervade the 
conduct of  such games when status distinctions 
and social hierarchies become increasingly 
entangled with them. Taking my cue from such 
studies, I too proceed to recast the so-called gift-
receiver from a passive into an active figure; 
however I also venture further afield by 
explicitly considering the gift from the vantage 
of  soliciting, itself  a desire-driven activity, which 
almost amounts to stealing, and yet manages 
successfully to sidestep the law and morality, and 
their negative consequences. The account I offer 
here stems in the first instance from a fuller 
recognition of  the actor, who by a variety of  
means draws out, elicits or solicits a gift. The 
importance of  soliciting is that it anticipates a 
partnership, and thereby creates the position of  
the donor, as well as pre-figuring the act of  
giving itself. In affirming the other side of  the 
gift, and the work accomplished by the soliciting 
agent, I moreover endeavour to describe a mode 
of  violence that precedes the moral, the legal 
and the contractual. Such a force I argue 
amounts to the indispensable ground on which 
the social is constituted.      5
Let us return to Mauss’ observations, briefly. 
Drawing on Malinowski’s (1922) equally classic 
study of  the Trobrianders, Mauss talks about a 
magic formula called the ‘spell of  the conch-
shell’ (2011: 23-24). Such a formula is 
extensively used for invoking kula valuables and 
is meant to charm and attract – towards the 
would-be donor – the very ‘objects’ the person 
who casts the spell intends to ask and receive 
from him. At the same time, the spell is also 
conceived of  as having the supplementary 
efficacy of  bringing such a state of  excitement to 
the mind of  the donor-to-be, causing him to be 
extremely open-handed and generous. 
Otherwise, it might occur to him to keep the 
‘objects’ gathered for himself. The end of  the 
spell is especially revealing for the tone of  kula 
relationships: ‘I shall kula, I shall rob my kula 
[partner]; I shall steal my kula [partner]; I shall 
pilfer my kula… My fame is like thunder, my 
steps are like earthquake’ (2011: 95). A series of  
similar spells, Mauss continues, express the same 
idea, casting the would-be donor as a crocodile 
and a bird of  prey working for the benefit of  his 
 This was the thrust of  Lévi-Strauss’s (1969) argument: in making the incest taboo the starting point of  culture, 4
Lévi-Strauss recognised that the law, i.e. prohibition, anticipates exchange and the social the latter brings forth.
 Despite highlighting the tensions and dynamics of  agonistic exchange, neither Weiner (1992) nor Beidelman 5
(1989) describe things from the perspective of  the would-be gift-receiver. Quite the contrary is true, especially for 
Weiner, whose keeping-while-giving paradox remains encased within a logic of  accumulation that is difficult to 
disassociate from similar tendencies arising within commodity production. Graeber’s (2001, 2011) studies remain 
closest to Mauss’ aims and are similarly motivated by a commitment to socialist ethics or what he calls 
‘individualistic communism’ [sic] (2001: 159). The emphasis is here, once again, on the free and moral 
individual who gives generously.  
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partner – i.e. the would-be receiver – by 
collecting and bringing him the very things the 
latter desires so strongly.  
The solicitation of  the gift, particularly of  
the violent or extractive type, is not limited to 
Melanesia; and Mauss makes no secret that the 
potlatch of  the North West American coast is 
especially animated by rivalry and antagonism 
as well as by excess, theatricality and the 
destruction, rather than the preservation, of  
value. Thus amongst the Tligit and the Haida 
of  Alaska, he argues, ‘the only way to 
demonstrate one’s fortune is by expending it to 
the humiliation of  others, by putting them in the 
shadow of  one’s name’ (2011: 37-38). In the 
same vein, Mauss continues noting that to take 
part in a potlatch is to accept a challenge, for 
failure to make a return is ‘enslavement for 
debt’, as in these societies, ‘face is lost for ever if  
a worthy return is not made or if  equivalent 
value is not destroyed’ (2011: 41). With 
ethnographic observations such as these, one is 
left wondering why Mauss so readily associates 
the gift with morality and goodness, espousing 
so eagerly a purportedly alternative economy of  
values that is based on ‘the joy of  giving in 
public, the delight in artistic expenditure, the 
pleasure of  hospitality in the public or private 
feast’ (2011: 67), and why he recommends with 
such excitation social insurance, mutual funds 
and the co-operative movement as the future 
return of  the ancient institutions of  the gift? In 
succumbing to these temptations Mauss is surely 
not alone; an expansive body of  anthropological 
work on the gift, reciprocity and charity is 
similarly pervaded by moral concerns and 
quests.  And yet one cannot escape wondering 6
what the anthropology of  the gift would be like 
if  it had not been written from the perspective 
of  a morally charged giving, but rather from the 
perspective of  an amoral soliciting? What if, in 
other words, the gift was no longer to be 
conceived as an adjunct to giving but as the 
accomplishment of  soliciting? What if  we were 
to apprehend giving as a secondary operation, 
and, instead of  seeing it as productive of  the 
gift, described it as the by-product of  taking?   
We have to be precise here; soliciting creates 
value by means of  drawing out wealth. As such 
it involves a taking as its appendage. However 
the taking involved is not the same as stealing; it 
is also entirely independent from borrowing and 
totally alien to accepting, especially insofar as 
the latter entails gratitude, indebtedness and 
self-effacement. There is simply a taking that 
follows soliciting – coming after it – in the place 
of  stealing, borrowing or receiving. The present 
article is an attempt to think about the 
conditions of  possibility of  taking, itself  
referring both to activities that can be described 
ethnographically and with reference to a 
theoretical stance. As an anthropology of  taking, 
it aims to deal ethnographically with the ways in 
which transfers of  wealth and value are 
accomplished through acts of  soliciting, which 
at once avoid succumbing to the logic of  the 
state and evade capture by the apparatus of  
morality. As a theoretical stance, it calls for due 
recognition of  the application of  force necessary 
in seeing transfers through, affirming rather than 
negating the violence involved. This affirmation 
is directly contingent on the violence in 
question, coming from outside the law and 
morality, located beyond the space of  the state, 
and on the far shores of  the self-styled righteous. 
As the very force that generates the social, this 
violence is neither assumed nor achieved; it is 
neither legitimate nor illegitimate; moreover, it is 
 Such attitude is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the moral economy approaches of  Geertz (1963) and 6
Scott (1976), both working on Southeast Asia, with Java looming large.  Such approaches have been rightly 
critiqued by many for their ideological basis, as they adopt a particular folk model about the ideal shape of  social 
relations, one based on harmony, solidarity and mutual aid, while redeploying it in the guise of  sociological 
account. This selective adoption is conducted on the grounds of  a convergence between the analyst’s bourgeois 
ethics of  a good life and certain peasant models of  value. In the end, the treatment of  the gift as reciprocity 
remains wholly subordinate to moral standards uncritically presumed as universal. Here, the moral itself, its 
conditions of  possibility, along with its particular effects, escape critical scrutiny. Contrary to such approaches, 
my effort is to highlight soliciting as a practice unburdened by moral questions, precisely because it comes before 
the gift, amounting to the latter’s cause and ground. As such, soliciting serves values other than liberal ones. To 
achieve this effect I, too, ally myself  with certain indigenous values as practiced in everyday life, and use them as 
the springboard for a more abstract discussion on the forces permeating the social.               
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neither moral nor immoral—and this because it 
is wholly coterminous with vios (life) and play; it 
simply is.  To better apprehend the issues at 7
hand, an excursion into Derrida’s critique of  the 
Maussian gift is required.  
‘One More Time, Staccato!’ 
To a certain extent soliciting is closely related 
to the concept of  elicitation Strathern (1988) 
deployed in her ground-breaking work on 
Melanesia. Undeniably inspired by Mauss, 
Strathern advances her own ‘aesthetics’ of  social 
relations in the region, and proposes that they 
are based on particular modalities of  making 
things known through exchanging valuables and 
engaging in displays. Strathern takes gift 
exchange to correspond to ‘moments of  bursting 
forth’ whereby a particular aspect of  a thing or 
a person is temporarily revealed by means of  
elicitation. Such ‘revelations’, her argument 
continues, require ‘an external audience or 
partner who, having elicited it, is also the 
coercive cause of  the act’ (1988:297). This 
partner is of  course none other than the 
donee(s), who, displaying his/her agency, 
proceeds to draw out the gift, making it part of  
him- or herself.  
Elsewhere I have myself  taken advantage of  
Strathern’s approach to portray neighbourhood 
exchanges in Java (Retsikas 2012). More recently 
I have however grown wary of  elicitation, and 
this is so for a number of  reasons. For one thing, 
the concept carries echoes of  the Socratic 
Method, the famous maieutics deployed in the 
search for the true and the good – things often 
taken as identical. Elicitation might not be 
strong enough to break with this tradition. 
Furthermore it shies away from coming to full 
terms with the violence inhabiting its 
organization and deployment, and in its close 
association with performances and displays it is 
too enmeshed with public acts. The emphasis on 
display comes at the expense of  more covert, 
secret and stealthy ways of  acting, and of  their 
particular aesthetic and effect.  
  	 I have therefore come to prefer, and 
now wish to propose, the concept of  solicitation. 
Soliciting comes from the vocabulary of  Derrida 
(1978), who deploys it as a synonym for 
deconstruction. Solicitation denotes the shaking 
of  a totality; linguistically, it is composed from 
sollus, which in Latin denotes ‘the whole’, and 
from citare, meaning ‘to put in motion’. For 
Derrida, solicitation is threatening to any 
philosophy or morality, for it entails the 
possibility of  illuminating not only its basic 
supports and overall architecture, but also that 
very secret place which any philosophy or 
morality must hide in order to remain a 
philosophy or morality. As such it bears the 
potential of  allowing us to see that very part or 
quality which must be suppressed and excluded 
in order to constitute meaning, truth and the 
good. Deconstruction is therefore both a 
philosophical method and a political exercise, 
for it strives to unhinge our values and draw a 
line of  flight for us to follow.  
This is how Derrida’s translator, Alan Bass, 
defines solicitation in his introduction to the 
English edition of  Writing and Difference (1978): 
Every totality, [Derrida] shows, can be totally 
shaken, that is can be shown to be founded on 
that which it excludes, that which would be in 
excess for a reductive analysis of  any kind. […] 
This etymological metaphor covering a 
philosophical-political violence is also implied 
in the notion of  archia […]. Archia derives from 
the Greek archē, which combines the senses of  a 
founding, original principle and of  government 
by one controlling principle […]. Philosophy is 
founded on the principle of  the archia, on 
regulation by true, original principles; the 
deconstruction of  philosophy reveals the 
differential excess which makes the archia 
possible. (1978: xviii) 
Derrida’s aim is to open things up once 
again so that we can experience them anew. Part 
of  his strategy is to induce such an intense 
feeling of  aporia and wonder to his readers that 
a new beginning in philosophy is launched. For 
this to happen, Derrida dwells on impasses in 
thought, and ponders over logical im-
possibilities. By forcibly ‘shaking’ Western 
metaphysics, he strives to arrive at a place where 
the formal rules of  logic no longer apply, 
showing all the while how the ‘traditional’ 
conception of  phenomena in exclusive terms – 
that is, as either this or that – is reductionist and 
founded on exclusions. In place of  a meta-
 Agamben (2005), reflecting on Benjamin, reiterates a crucial distinction: mythico-juridical violence is always a 7
means to an end and thus susceptible to legal reasoning; in contrast, ‘pure violence’ is free from such 
determinations for it precedes the law and reason, and is as innocent as children’s play.   
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physics, then, which approaches truth as 
contingent on a priori essences and fixed origins, 
Derrida favours difference, defining phenomena 
‘inclusively’ – that is, as both this and that – and 
as always unfolding, shifting, and changing. 
These tactics permit Derrida to un-bound and 
release the excess that traditional metaphysics 
has captured and repressed, thus allowing 
thinking to begin anew.  
As is well known, Derrida (1991) has 
himself  solicited Mauss’ study and found the 
repressed element to correspond to what is 
normally construed as the ‘free’, ‘pure’, ‘selfless’ 
or ‘disinterested’ gift.  According to Derrida, the 8
‘pure’ gift remains an impossibility in Mauss’ 
study, for the gift is always conceived as being 
caught up in the circle of  reciprocity. By 
following a regular movement in time and space 
as set out in the three obligations, the gift as a 
spontaneous, ‘pre-objective’, and un-reflexive 
gesture towards the other is negated, for it is 
duly domesticated by the dictates of  exchange. 
‘If  the gift is annulled in the economic odyssey 
of  the circle as soon as it appears as gift or as 
soon as it signifies itself  as gift, there is no longer 
any ‘logic of  the gift’, and one may safely say 
that a consistent discourse on the gift becomes 
impossible: It misses its object and always 
speaks, finally, of  something else’ (1992: 24)—
i.e. reciprocity, exchange, contract, debt, 
sacrifice, the economy, etc.  
Reacting to the negation of  the gift, Derrida 
formulates two essential conditions for it to be 
re-thought: (a) that giving must be conceived 
independently of  involving, demanding or 
anticipating a return; and (b) that for (a) to be 
possible, both the donee and the donor must not 
recognise themselves as such. For, the moment 
such recognition occurs, the gift and the relation 
to the other it privileges – a relation unburdened 
by contract, obligation, debt and hierarchy – 
ceases to exist. On the positive side, Derrida 
invites one to reconceptualise the gift as 
contingent on forgetting – the forgetting of  the 
passing of  the gift, and the forgetting of  that 
forgetting – arguing that what this double 
forgetting evinces is something other than a 
sociological category, a theological name or a 
philosophical identity. The French philosopher 
wisely refrains from specifying what this 
‘something other’ might be; instead he employs 
most general and cryptic terms, writing that it 
has to do with ‘a set of  traits defining a given 
situation in which something, or ‘that’ [‘ça’] is 
established (as in expressions ‘the human 
condition’, ‘the social condition,’ and so 
forth)’ (1992: 17). 
There is no question that what Derrida is 
after here is the elaboration of  an ethics for 
living and analysing. Such an ethics he strives to 
ground on the aporias generated by the gift, for 
a genuine gift is actually possible only when it is 
not understood as such. For Derrida, thinking of  
the gift in these terms is extremely important. It 
indicates an opening towards realising an 
immediate relation to the Other that affirms 
rather than negates his/her alterity. The French 
philosopher poses this relation as contingent on 
the ‘pure’ gift and its double forgetting. What 
this forgetting ensures is the Other’s ontological 
primacy and political autonomy. In other words, 
forgetting acts to mitigate the violence that the 
passing of  the gift effects on the other in terms 
of  the ever-present possibility of  construing 
him/her, even momentarily, as a recipient in 
need and/or beneficiary of  one’s largesse. The 
problem Derrida identifies with reciprocity is 
principally that it places the other into 
(temporary) debt, making him/her politically 
inferior and ontologically secondary to, even 
derivative of, the self. It is precisely this 
degradation, arising in the play of  the social, 
that Derrida cautions against. So much is 
readily apparent in the way Derrida reads 
‘Counterfeit Money’, where he implicitly 
counter-poses Baudelaire’s story to Mauss’ study, 
but also in the way he has elsewhere talked 
about ghosts and justice (1994), and hospitality 
(2000).  
A question inescapably arises: has Derrida 
gone far enough in soliciting the hidden 
presuppositions, and in freeing the potential of  
the element(s) otherwise suppressed? Has he 
provided an alternative way to conceiving the 
 For an anthropological critique of  Derrida, see Laidlaw 2000. My own position is that Laidlaw has 8
misunderstood Derrida’s wider philosophical project and aims. Moreover Laidlaw’s Jain material does not 
convincingly demonstrate the existence of  pure gift in India; because Jain renouncers do bestow their blessing, 
however inaudible or muffled it is, on those presenting them with food, Laidlaw unwittingly confirms Derrida’s 
position regarding the impossibility of  the so-called ‘pure’ gift.        
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other and the ‘social condition’? I would argue 
that there is still more that needs to be done in 
our rethinking of  the gift, and in our affirmation 
of  the other. The problem is mainly this: the 
ethics Derrida espouses still pertain to the 
perspective of  the donor, as it is the donor 
whom Derrida sees as ultimately responsible for 
the forgetting to take effect. The more successful 
the donor is in his struggle against the work of  
memory, the more the violence he/she exercises 
on the other stands to be allayed and inhibited 
from breaking out. Derrida therefore evokes a 
self-disciplining and self-effacing subject, who 
values the aesthetics of  humility and modesty, 
and is in total control of  bodily and mental 
functions. It is precisely because of  such 
evocations that Derrida’s analytics fall back into 
the trap of  reproducing the very asymmetries 
they endeavour to banish. In other words, the 
distinction is still on the side of  the donor. For it 
is still the donor who, in instantaneously 
forgetting the gift, displays an undeniable 
superiority, itself  stemming from his/her 
intention to save the donee from indebtedness 
and obligation. The theological-philosophical 
metaphysics Derrida so thoroughly derides 
somehow manages to sneak back in. The quest 
therefore must begin anew: Is there another way 
for personal responsibility to be conceived? Is 
there a different manner for the other to become 
manifest and for an alternative mode of  
violence to come into play? I would like to think 
so, and will suggest that the answer to these 
questions hinges on describing the event of  the 
social from the perspective of  taking. The taking 
in question involves secrecy and stealth, and it 
welcomes the exercise of  a soliciting force with 
this secrecy, with this invitation acting as the 
main channel for affirming the primacy of  the 
Other. A return to ethnography and Java will 
show us precisely how, despite the problems 
already identified, we can critically reassert 
deconstruction, and creatively redeploy and 
renew Derrida’s analytical emphases and 
political priorities.     
  
Vanishings 
When a relatively new and expensive laptop 
computer disappeared from the house of  Haji 
Kamil in a well-off  neighbourhood in central 
Surabaya, the haji suspected foul play. Although 
he was not 100% sure, he put the blame on his 
security staff  and, in particular, on a young man 
he had dismissed the previous week for being 
lazy and absent-minded. The young man who 
had barely been at the job for three months had 
contacts in the city’s underworld, the haji 
asserted, a claim few people in Indonesia would 
find implausible. However the haji refrained 
from contacting the police about the theft. This 
could have been either because of  fear of  
reprisals from the alleged thief ’s friends in the 
criminal underworld, or because of  perceptions 
of  the police as reluctant to intervene where 
there are no additional incentives on offer. And 
so the matter of  the laptop’s disappearance was 
quickly forgotten, never mentioned again either 
by the haji or his family.    
A couple of  months after the incident, a 
quite different version of  events came to my 
attention. According to this version, the 
disappearance of  the laptop was not down to 
theft. The bearer of  news was a street food 
vendor who owned a stall selling chicken soup 
outside a mosque located a few hundred meters 
from the haji’s house. He too had heard of  the 
disappearance (hilang) of  the laptop, but he put it 
down to zakat, the Islamic tithe. According to 
the vendor, the haji was notorious all over 
Surabaya for his extravagant life-style, numerous 
and luxurious houses, and his taste for sports 
cars. Additionally he was known to have 
recently taken as a second wife a very beautiful 
and relatively young dangdut (a popular music 
genre) singer. Though the haji owned a large 
transport company sending off  goods to distant 
ports in Eastern Indonesia, as well as abroad, 
the vendor claimed that he had gained most of  
his wealth from lending money on interest. This 
is a most contentious practice that the majority 
of  Muslim jurists classify as unlawful (haram), 
and of  which many Javanese strongly 
disapprove, due its predatory and exploitative 
connotations, especially when it involves the 
poor and marginalised. Perhaps to reinforce his 
point, the vendor portrayed the haji as mean, 
stingy and indifferent to the goings-on of  the 
neighbourhood, adding that he was known to be 
negligent in his observance of  zakat. He further 
noted that, in addition to being the duty of  well-
off  believers, which is owed to God, zakat was 
also the right of  the destitute and the poor (hak 
fakir miskin). 
 The street vendor’s comment about zakat 
being a right is particularly significant as far as 
solicitation is concerned. For one thing, the 
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vendor ’s comment echoe s nor mat i ve 
jurisprudential conceptualisations of  zakat as an 
entitlement (hak) pertaining to eight categories 
of  persons, all of  which are listed in the Quran.  9
Amongst them, the most important are the 
destitute and the poor (fakir miskin). Furthermore, 
the vendor’s remarks also resonate with another 
set of  views that conceive of  wealth, its 
proliferation and/or disappearance as intimately 
connected with zakat via the intervention of  
Allah. Somewhat simplified, such views run as 
follows: if  a well-off  Muslim pays zakat as 
required, one’s wealth, affluence, well-being, 
business etc. will be protected and multiplied by 
Allah; for Allah rewards handsomely those who 
follow His commandments. However, if  a duty-
bound Muslim refrains from performing zakat 
worship, his possessions will be destroyed, vanish 
and/or go missing; for Allah duly punishes those 
who disobey him.  In this regard, the 10
implications of  the vendor’s comment – viz. that 
the disappearance of  the laptop was related to 
zakat – could not have been clearer. There was 
no theft involved at all; the disappearance of  the 
laptop was the result of  the exercise of  a right 
(hak); the laptop’s rightful owner was not the haji 
but the person entitled to the haji’s zakat. A 
person probably belonging to the category of  
the ‘destitute and poor’ had taken the laptop in 
place of  the zakat that the haji had failed to 
observe—that is, as his outstanding zakat. 
Somewhat differently put, and allowing for the 
divine to come into the picture more fully, the 
vendor’s comments could be taken to highlight 
the following: the laptop had been removed by 
Allah as retribution for the haji’s laxity in 
performing zakat. Such removal was a stark 
reminder that he should correct his ways if  he 
did not wish to see his fortunes reversed. 
Subsequently, the laptop had been allocated to 
another person; such a person probably 
belonged to the poor and destitute category. For, 
according to scripture, the latter count amongst 
the rightful owners of  zakat. 
Concerns over ownership and the en-
forcement of  property rights, and obligations, 
are central to this episode of  urban life; so too 
are imperatives for justice and the requirement 
for stealth and secrecy in its attainment. In 
exploring such issues, we might begin by noting 
that the discourse on zakat as currently 
promoted in Indonesia and elsewhere, both by 
activists and scholars, construes zakat primarily 
as an obligation to Allah, and thus as equivalent 
to a tax levied once a year on certain types of  
property (al-Qardawi 2000; Benthall 1999; 
Mas’udi 2005). Alternatively zakat may be 
construed as alms, and thus as equivalent to a 
philanthropic activity performed by the affluent 
(Bamualim 2006; Latief  2014; Salim 2008; 
Singer 2008). These two conceptualisations are 
intimately connected, for the carrying out of  
zakat as a duty involves the subsequent transfer 
of  the wealth involved to the poor and the 
needy in the manner of  a gift. However, as I 
discuss in greater detail elsewhere (Retsikas 
2014), the alternative position of  zakat as an 
entitlement pertaining to specific categories of  
persons signifies a ‘minor’ position in the 
literature, which is largely unelaborated and 
inadequately attended to. This ‘minor’ position 
is nevertheless acknowledged in the writings of  
such luminaries as Sayyid Qutb, the famous 
intellectual and leading member of  the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s, 
who notes in passing that zakat ‘is as much the 
right of  those who receive it as it is the duty of  
those who pay it’ (2000: 164). For Qutb, zakat is 
 These are mentioned in surat At-Taubat, verse 60; they are the destitute, the poor, the zakat collectors, new 9
converts, slaves, debtors, those advancing God’s cause, and the wayfarers. 
 In her monograph on the demise of  the once affluent batik trading families of  Solo, Central Java, Suzanne 10
Brenner briefly relates that according to popular imagination, the non-transfer of zakat by such wealthy 
individuals was causally related to their experience of  ill fortune. In this regard, she writes that ‘there was broad 
speculation as to what had caused the downfall of  this [Atmosusilo] family. A former juragan [entrepreneur] of  
the Kauman suggested this was God’s retribution for Atmosusilo’s greediness and his failure to give the alms 
(zakat) required of  all Muslims who can afford it. (In fact, it was not uncommon to hear devout Muslims from 
outside the community, Arabs as well as Javanese, remark that the downfall of  Laweyan [Brenner’s field locality, 
and Solo’s batik industry centre] as a whole had been brought about by its residents’ unwillingness to give the 
obligatory alms despite their abundant wealth’ (1998: 212).  In such context, not even a haji’s demonstrated piety 
provides any assurances as to divine favour. Quite the opposite is true. As Darmadi (2013) notes for West Java, 
the figure of  the haji is quite often implicated in accusations of  social aloofness with rumours linking the 
attaining of  fast wealth with the practise of  usury, and of  unconstrained desires demonstrated by polygamous 
lifestyles.  
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instrumental in the achievement of  economic 
justice as envisioned in Islam, for it corresponds 
to a mechanism of  redistribution. In addition, it 
effects the ‘purification of  property itself, because 
it means paying what is due on the property, after 
which its possession is legal’ (2000: 162). Similarly, 
Yusuf  al-Qardawi, one of  the most widely 
recognised among contemporary authorities on 
zakat jurisprudence, concurs that zakat is indeed a 
right. While reflecting on the wisdom found in 
several Quranic verses dating from the Meccan 
period, he notes that their aim is to make 
‘sincere believers realize [that] their wealth is 
not only for their use. They realize that part of  
it belongs in fact to the needy not as a 
charitable gift given with condescendence but 
as a clear-cut right without humbleness on the 
part of  the receiver or pride on the part of  the 
payer’ (2000:9). 
This ‘minor’ or ‘counter-hegemonic’ 
understanding of  zakat is affirmed in Java, both 
by referring to zakat claimants as mustahiq, a 
jurisprudential term literally designating in 
Arabic those entitled to zakat, and in everyday 
life every time something goes missing. Three of  
the most common responses to vanished wealth 
are that a robbery (maling) has taken place; a 
tuyul – a spirit in the shape of  a human child – 
has been at play, acting on behalf  of  his human 
master; or that the property in question 
corresponded to unpaid zakat—that is, zakat due 
to others. While the first two responses 
acknowledge an illegal removal, and recognise 
an illegitimately exercised violence, the third 
response puts the blame squarely on the person 
who has yet to transfer the zakat that is due. 
Such a person is normally denounced for 
committing kurang amal, i.e. for having done less 
than his/her fair share of  good deeds, having 
failed to meet his/her obligations to others.  In 11
this context, the non-transfer of  zakat is 
equivalent to theft due to the misappropriation 
of  wealth that is not one’s own to retain, but 
rather another’s to enjoy and dispose as a matter 
of  right. The violence recognised by the third 
response is therefore seen as emanating from the 
unlawfu l re tent ion o f  va lue and the 
inappropriate withholding of  wealth that 
belongs to others.  In this context the forceful 12
and stealthy soliciting of  zakat is on the other 
side of  the illegal and the illegitimate, and 
corresponds to a requirement for the realisation 
of  justice. 
Enforcing the right to zakat in this manner 
rests on taking. Such taking neither succeeds 
giving, nor does it presuppose presenting. It is 
neither equivalent to receiving, nor does it 
 The flip side of  this attitude to wealth is the reward one gets for having performed an unselfish or charitable 11
deed. This reward is commonly denoted by the term rezeki that refers to a gift from God that is also one’s due 
recompense for prior acts of  personal sacrifice. Rezeki is not limited to monetary forms; it can also be linked to 
health, longevity, happiness, affluence in terms of  descendants, and good fortune in acquiring a spouse. Such 
attitudes have recently been repackaged and propagated anew by Muslim TV evangelist Yusuf  Mansur (2008) 
and syariah entrepreneurship guru Ippho Santosa (2010). To the extent to which their approach to Islam and 
prosperity mixes freely the commercial and the pietistic, they are both direct descendants of  a previous 
generation of  popular Muslim figures such as Ari Ginanjar (Rudnyckyj 2011) and Abdullah Gymnastiar 
(Hoesteray 2015). What connects them all together is that their take on the faith speaks directly to the anxieties 
and aspirations of  an Indonesian middle-class emerging out of  the ruins of  the 1997 Asian economic crisis, 
intent on making it big in this life and the afterlife.   
 It should be fairly obvious that zakat has serious implications for our understanding of  property rights in Islam, 12
and Muslim countries in general. Such rights are conceived of  and practiced on grounds other than those 
recognised in liberal political economies that prioritise the human, and the claims individuals have to the 
product of  their labour (or to equivalent recompense). I have noted such differences elsewhere, writing that ‘zakat 
differs both from the free gift and philanthropic giving in that the wealth transferred is not one’s own to offer (or 
keep) as it properly belongs to others. Adjusting our language would require that we speak of  wealth transferred 
(or handed over) rather than bestowed: a mustahiq is not a recipient but a person entitled to that wealth. 
Recognition of  the rights of  mustahiq requires therefore the payment of  zakat—that is, the calculation of  the 
exact portion of  wealth due to others and of  its prompt transfer. According to this conception, it is only the 
remainder one can claim to possess and dispose of; it is only what remains after this process – of  calculation, 
division, partition and apportion – has taken place that is legally one’s to take hold of. In other words, the kinds 
of  ‘private, individual property rights’ envisioned are not absolute, but rather contingent on the performance of  
zakat. As such, they do not accrue automatically from the labour process, whether intellectual or manual, but 
follow upon zakat’s division and partition, founded upon the transfer of  other people’s dues […]. Moreover, such 
‘property rights’ are better understood within a theological context that fully acknowledges Allah as the creator 
of  everything and of  humankind as His steward’. (Retsikas 2014: 351). 
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assume formal accepting.  In most general 13
terms, it amounts to a value transfer 
accomplished by means of  craft iness, 
shrewdness and concealment. Soliciting 
recognises the Other – the one to whom zakat is 
due – as capable of  acting purposefully, 
effectively and efficiently with a view to seeing 
his/her divine-given rights restored and 
respected. Moreover, it entails that the Other 
conduct his/her affairs in such a way that his/
her identity remains elusive and secret. Secrecy 
is also the manner in which the value transfer is 
conducted. The Other that the forceful taking 
of  zakat brings forth is therefore both unknown 
and unknowable. As such he/she is free from 
the violence the bestowal of  names and the 
passing of  the gift incur on their recipients, who 
have their identities given and fixed in the very 
process of  giving. In contrast, due to the 
importance of  stealth and concealment, 
soliciting exceeds pure giving in safeguarding 
and maintaining the Other’s primacy and 
autonomy. Indeed, the value of  concealment is 
often expressed in Islam when scholars 
emphasise that giving in secret is often 
preferable to giving in public. This is because 
giving in public potentially compromises both 
muzakki (zakat payer) and mustahiq (zakat 
claimant). It allows the muzakki to feel important 
before an audience, and to gain in status what 
they ‘lose’ in wealth; while at the same time it 
imposes upon the claimants an inferior position, 
for they are made to look like recipients of  aid. 
In this regard, several Islamic scholars 
emphasise that transferring zakat with the wrong 
set of  intentions, such as those of  pride and self-
righteousness, risks invalidating the ritual, 
transforming it into sin. In surpassing both 
giving in secret and giving in public, soliciting is 
always on the side of  the Other, to whom zakat 
is due, for it affords him/her unrecognizability 
and anonymity. By effectively locating the Other 
beyond the grasp of  identification, soliciting 
construes him/her as a known unknown—an 
ever-present mystery and persistent aporia.  14
At the same time, both soliciting and taking 
bypass considerations of  crime, effectively 
‘bracketing’ human law within the demands of  
justice, which, crucially, is of  divine inspiration. 
Enforcing zakat through soliciting is thus located 
on the outside of  human law, on a vast 
‘territory’ making up a frontier, and constituted 
by a limit. The significance of  the limit is to 
demarcate an exterior and infinite space 
permeated by otherness: the otherness of  the 
divine, inclusive of  the alterity of  divine 
authority. The purpose of  the frontier is to 
guard against a collapse, or breakdown, in the 
difference between the divine and the human—
which for Islam would amount to unbelief, a 
major sin. When viewed in these terms, it is 
impossible to equate the removal of  wealth 
 In her original review of  the article, Carla Jones astutely observed that, in Java, soliciting is not limited to cases 13
of  wealth disappearing, but extends to bazaar encounters where ‘the act to persuade buyers to part with their 
funds involves elaborate performances of  deference, sweetness, force and dependence’. This much should be 
fairly apparent to anyone who has spent time in a Javanese or, for that matter, any Southeast Asian market, 
where intense, lively, and often fiercely competitive bargaining takes place between, usually female, sellers and 
buyers over the price of  the goods on offer. In their research on markets in Java, Jennifer and Paul Alexander 
(1987) have described with great insight the basic contours this alternate soliciting involves, with sellers trying to 
achieve as high a price as possible through attracting the attention of  passers-by, engaging in rapid-fire patter, 
language level manipulation, regular complimenting, occasional anger, and even ridicule (see also Brenner 1998). 
For their part, buyers’ craftiness in acquiring goods for as low a price as possible involves avoiding giving in to 
seller’s bids through interchanging items, walking off, feigning sudden disinterest or requesting extras. 
Undeniably this is a battle where the rapid valuation of  goods is interjected with temporary valuations of  the 
persons involved in terms of  their social worth. To the extent that soliciting is both about agonistic value 
transfers and a valued practice itself, it is also of  direct relevance to the way the bazaar economy operates, given 
the latter’s general ‘embeddeness’ in the asymmetric flows making up the social in Java. However, the soliciting I 
speak of  goes one important step further than that practiced in the market, for it works to ensure the anonymity 
of  the Other. In resisting the impulse of  objectification, it maintains that the Other’s identity remains hidden 
from view. Moreover, the soliciting I wish to highlight here welcomes the force coming from the side of  the 
Other, seeking to affirm rather than domesticate or subdue the violence the Other brings to the relation, raising 
it to the nth degree.
 On aporia, see also Retsikas 2010, 2012.14
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through claiming zakat to a crime, for it is simply 
an act favourable in the eyes of  God.  As I have 15
already stressed, muzakki who duly observe their 
obligations are expected to see their wealth 
multiplied; in contrast, those reluctant to part 
with what is due to others will see their wealth 
reduced. This reduction is not due to criminal 
activity; rather it is precisely what is necessary 
for justice to be achieved. The justice in 
question exceeds any sense of  fairness that 
human beings might conceive or implement; to 
the faithful, it is the most perfect form of  justice, 
with its unrivalled perfection guaranteed by its 
emanation from the divine Other.   
Enforcing this just ice requires the 
deployment of  stealth and covertness. 
Concealing the identities of  those involved is 
paramount to its realisation; managing not to 
exercise violence against the Other requires that 
the identity of  mustahiq remains hidden and 
indeter minate. This indeter minacy i s 
accompanied by two further, equally crucial 
features. First, divine justice is unavoidable, 
inevitable and unpreventable; it will be achieved 
whatever happens. Sooner or later, either in this 
life or in the next, it will come; there is no 
escape from it. Second, soliciting has agency 
always already located on the side of  the Other. 
It is Allah and the mustahiq who act. The ‘I’, the 
muzakki – that is, the donor – merely re-acts. 
Both characteristics place soliciting at odds with 
justice as currently pursued in Indonesia, and 
elsewhere. In the last decade or so, the 
enforcement of  the right to solicit zakat in the 
country has been turned into a bitterly fought 
battle between institutions representing the state 
and civil society associations (Fauzia 2013; 
Latief  2013; Salim 2006).  The battle revolves 16
around questions over which side is more 
legitimate in assuming and pursuing zakat’s 
enforcement. On the one hand, advocates for 
the state eagerly remind the faithful of  the 
example the Prophet set in Medina, where he 
imposed zakat as state tax. To this, advocates for 
voluntary associations stress that state officials in 
Indonesia and elsewhere in the Muslim world 
are often guilty of  dishonest and corrupt usage 
of  public funds. For their part, state advocates 
worry that the potential for corruption and 
dishonesty inheres equally in civil society 
organisations, some of  which award their 
managers large salaries and maintain close 
connections to political parties, especially 
Islamist ones. In response, zakat activists and 
relevant civil bodies routinely emphasise the 
injustices the Indonesian state has perpetrated 
against its own people, stressing the ways in 
which state policies are responsible for 
widespread poverty and mass suffering. Despite 
their differences, which are both numerous and 
not insignificant, both sides of  the argument 
purport to act in the name of  Allah, to be 
defenders of  shariah and natural allies to the 
destitute and poor. They conceive of  zakat 
justice as realizable and deliverable exclusively 
through their intermediation, portraying 
themselves as both central and essential in its 
dispensation. In this regard, both sides are very 
similar; by making themselves indispensable in 
the application of  the rights of  others, they seek 
to arrest zakat and its soliciting, domesticate its 
excess and appropriate its power – including 
significant financial resources – for their own 
ends. Whether such projects are authoritarian/
patrimonial or liberal/neo-liberal is not what 
matters most. What is of  utmost concern is 
that, in constantly referring to mustahiq as 
recipients and beneficiaries – and circulating 
their images in newspapers, magazines, and 
TV advertisements – both state institutions and 
civil society bodies perpetrate violence. For, 
under these circumstances, soliciting is 
characterized neither by concealment nor 
secrecy; what is more, the right to zakat is 
denied as one’s own to claim.  
The issue of  zakat and its enforcement, 
however, is not restricted to such debates. That 
is to say, it is not merely a matter of  whether one 
sides with the apparatus arbitrating legality, or 
favours the instruments promoting propriety. 
 A verse from the Quran often cited in Islamic circles pre-occupied with zakat proclaims: ‘Take sadaqah (alms) 15
from their wealth in order to purify them and sanctify them with it, and invoke Allah for them. Verily! Your 
invocations are a source of  security for them, and Allah is All-Hearer, All-Knower’ (At-Taubah 103). 
 The quest for justice is central in efforts, undertaken both in Indonesia and worldwide, for Muslims to come 16
up with an Islamic alternative to capitalism. Hefner (1997) and Choiruzzad (2013) provide insightful accounts of  
the history of  such efforts in Indonesia, emphasising the diversity of  the approaches advocated. Zakat, along with 
the question of  riba (usury/interest), are at the forefront of  the movement for the creation of  an Islamic economy 
in the country.  
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Rather, taking a Foucauldian (2008) perspective, 
we might recognize this as a pseudo-dilemma 
warranting our suspicion. Soliciting points a way 
out of  the limits imposed by the state-civil 
society distinction. By means of  artfully carving 
a space in-between the legal and the illegal, 
soliciting escapes the sanction of  the law. In 
addition, it evades succumbing to standards of  
upright conduct by moving in a lateral, sideways 
manner, cutting across the hilly terrain of  social 
mores. In order to underscore once more the 
way in which taking accomplishes this double 
coup de grâce, I revert to a story from the field. 
During my stay in Surabaya in the same 
rainy season of  2011-2012, I also came to know 
quite well Ibu Nurhayati, a forty-something wife 
of  an on-and-off  construction worker, mother 
of  five young children, and newly appointed 
manager of  an Islamic micro-finance institution. 
The institution had been set up by an Islamic 
charitable foundation a couple of  years 
beforehand in an effort to ‘empower’ the poor 
inhabitants of  one of  the city’s most deprived 
districts, which was situated next to the harbour. 
The plan involved the dispensing of  funds 
initially collected as zakat to the local poor, with 
the purpose of  stimulating their micro-
enterprises—which involved, among other 
things, running food-and-drinks stalls, donut-
making, and petty cloth trading. I have narrated 
elsewhere (Retsikas 2015) the ‘technicalities’ 
involved in using zakat moneys for micro-
lending, s tress ing the jur i sprudent ia l , 
organisational, and financial innovations the 
micro-credit ‘revolution’ in the field of  Islamic 
economics has ushered in. Undeniably attracted 
by the promise of  prosperity, and the capital 
made instantly available, more than two 
hundred women and two men enlisted in the 
program.  From then on, these recipients of  17
‘financial aid’ were obliged to keep up with a 
regimen of  weekly meetings and regular house-
visits, which were deemed necessary for ensuring 
both compliance with the tempo of  deferred 
repayment,  and with requirements for 18
methodical skills training, efficient budgeting 
and record keeping, as well as overall program 
monitoring. 
According to Ibu Nurhayati, there were only 
a few cases in which people were able to claim 
the funds on offer without subjecting themselves 
to such disciplinary procedures, which would 
have put them in a position of  indebtedness—at 
once symbolic and material. The two cases of  
which Ibu Nurhayati was aware took place in 
the initial stages of  the program, and she said 
they involved people who had since left the city, 
having disappeared from the face of  the earth—
thereby remaining anonymous and unidentified 
to the authorities. Equally, the claims such 
people put forward implicated the powers of  
soliciting: their conduct in seeing that the value 
transfer was carried through involved the 
deployment of  craftiness, shrewdness and 
concealment. What they did was the following. 
In order to qualify for financial assistance, the 
two ‘solicitors’ simulated their involvement in 
micro-enterprise by constructing a set of  
impromptu food stalls using equipment 
borrowed on the spur of  the moment from 
friends and relatives. This simulation took 
advantage of  the unsuspecting representative 
 As in other parts of  the world, the practice of  micro-finance in Indonesia is very much a gendered affair 17
involving a disproportionate number of  women, relative to men, as trainees/aid recipients. Micro-finance 
institutions operating in the country rationalise their choice of  empowerment targets as conforming to long-
standing traditions of  women being both economically active and in charge of  household budgets, and thus 
ultimately responsible for ensuring family welfare. In addition, this selection allows husbands to continue validly 
to claim the status of  ‘household head’ (kepala keluarga), a position sanctioned both in state law and Islamic 
jurisprudence. It is precisely because men are usually excluded from becoming financial aid recipients, thus 
coming under the explicit and direct supervision of  microcredit institutions, that they are able to claim authority 
over family matters.  
 Most of  the zakat moneys used to finance the program were dispensed on the basis of  murabaha contracts 18
undertaken by the micro-finance institution and specific, named individuals. Murabaha is a sale-based instrument, 
involving the finance institution purchasing a good on behalf  of  a client and the subsequent selling of  the same 
good to him/her at cost, plus a declared margin, with the payment being deferred for a specified time period. In 
the case under discussion, the mark-up did not amount to profit, as it was used to enhance the capacities of  the 
program at the local level. The use of  zakat for micro-lending purposes is highly controversial both in Indonesia 
and across the Islamic world. However a relatively recent edict issued by the Indonesian Council of  Muslim 
Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), and entitled Using Zakat for Investment (no. 4/2003), sanctions such an option. 
For more information see Retsikas 2015.
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from the micro-finance institution, who had 
given them advance warning of  a visit to 
validate their activities. As a result of  their 
ingenuity, contracts were signed, and funds of  as 
much as 1 million rupiah changed hands—after 
which the ‘solicitors’ made a quick exit, never to 
be seen again, their names and faces now 
forgotten.  
Ibu Nurhayati, as well as many others 
involved in the practice of  Islamic micro-
finance, found such simulation morally 
reprehensible, as there was guile and cunning 
involved. Yet, they also stressed that the people 
concerned were not guilty of  misappropriation, 
theft or anything of  the sort. Moreover, they had 
no case to answer for.  In their capacity as ‘the 19
poor’, theirs was, and remained, a valid claim to 
zakat. In this regard, the validity of  zakat 
entitlement renders all other concerns as 
secondary and contingent. The same applied to 
‘aid recipients’, who found themselves unable to 
repay the micro-loan advanced when, for a 
variety of  reasons, their business ran into trouble, 
they fell ill, or were otherwise unable to work. 
According to representatives of  the Islamic 
micro-finance institution, they too were exempt 
from the typical obligations surrounding loan 
repayment, for their zakat right overrode any 
responsibilities ensuing from the credit contract 
that they had signed. The overall significance of  
such a mode of  soliciting was confirmed when, in 
an interview with Prof. Muhammad Amin Suma, 
Dean of  the Faculty of  Syariah and Law at the 
esteemed Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif  Hidayatullah 
Jakarta, he too posited the primacy of  zakat 
justice, observing that 
It is ok to give zakat to the poor as capital. In the 
process of  empowerment, some mustahiq’s 
business is successful, and then there are those 
who are not. The latter might find themselves 
in difficulty when trying to return the money 
lent. In the past, there were many cases of  
wiping the record clean, when the issue of  debt 
was not pursued further. But this presented us 
with new problems, as many people thought 
that it was okay to take [ambil] the funds 
without any obligation to return them. Because 
of  such problems, this method [of  dispensing 
zakat] should no longer be used. The poor 
should be given zakat as capital, but there 
should no longer be any requirement regarding 
its return.  
Conclusion 
Anthropological writings on the gift by 
Mauss, Derrida and others have been inspired 
by the desire to achieve more than a description 
of  what is going on in faraway places; 
commitment to culture critique has been a key 
motivation. Alongside it, there has also been the 
pursuit of  an alternative to the market 
conception of  social life, and the search for a 
new ethics. My claim is that this conception, 
along with the anthropology of  the gift, has to 
be constituted anew. For the inquiry has so far 
been conducted from the perspective of  the 
giver, and has often uncritically equated giving 
with morality, and civility, the good and the true. 
This has also been the case with studies critical 
of  an influential literature equating the gift with 
reciprocity. In counter-distinction, my argument 
has been that both the powers of  soliciting, and 
the perspective arising from acts of  taking, 
remain hidden in – and are actively suppressed 
by –  the more visible ideals that organise 
anthropological and Derridian renditions of  the 
gift. The brief  ethnographic excursion to the 
Javanese landscape of  zakat practice has allowed 
me to describe soliciting as irreducible, and as 
prior to giving. This is especially so for those 
Muslims I know, for whom soliciting zakat 
derives from a God-given right to a portion of  
the wealth presently – if  temporarily – possessed 
by their more prosperous compatriots. Likewise, 
the Javanese material presented here demands 
critical engagement with the violence entailed in 
the act of  soliciting: the force of  this ineluctable 
violence is a manifestation of  justice in process.  
Soliciting comprises the shaking of  totalities; 
as such it violently opens up the space for a new 
ethics to emerge. This ethics is necessary for 
both analytical and political purposes. Soliciting 
demands the radical reconfiguration of  the 
Other; it is not enough simply to recast the 
Other from a passive recipient of  a generously 
bestowed gift into an active figure in its 
presentation. The sweeping move is rather to 
conceive the Other as the cause of, and the 
occasion for, the self. For the Muslims with 
whom I am familiar, individual rights of  
ownership are established only after the zakat 
due on the property in question has been paid 
and transferred to those entitled to it. It is on 
 The 1989 Religious Judicature Act vests Islamic courts in Indonesia with the substantive jurisdiction and 19
enforcement powers over economic transactions based on Islamic law (Cammack and Feener 2012). 
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condition of  such rights’ recognition and 
application that one’s wealth is bound to 
subsequently increase. Viewed in this context, 
the concealment, anonymity and secrecy 
soliciting affords the mustahiq begins to make 
new sense: for wealth, prosperity, well-being to 
be achieved, the other has to remain inviolate 
and hidden. For vitality and profusion to come 
about, the requirement is for the other to 
perdure as the known unknown. My claim is that 
the vital excess the other signifies is beyond the 
goodness of  the gift, beyond the honour of  the 
contract, beyond the lights of  reason: soliciting 
and the violence it requires is the ground and the 
condition of  possibility of  them all. 
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   ith this essay, Konstantinos Retsikas joins a 
venerable literature on the sociality of  exchange. 
Based on examples from Java, Retsikas asks how 
our theories of  gifting and indebtedness appear 
in the context of  pious Islamic economies. Or 
perhaps more accurately, he asks how they do 
not appear. When things and money disappear 
without a trace, they demand an explanation. 
Moments of  mysterious loss can be understood 
as theft, the work of  mischievous spirits, or bad 
luck. In contemporary Java, as Retsikas shows 
us, one other explanation is zakat, the charitable 
tithe on wealth redistributed to the poor that is 
one of  the five central tenets of  Islam.  
Reframing a loss into a gift recalls a long 
scholarship on exchange, famously initiated by 
Marcel Mauss and expanded by Jacques 
Derrida, David Graeber and Marilyn Strathern, 
among others. Central to each of  these 
approaches has been the fundamentally social 
nature of  circulation. So central is the social to 
these analyses, many of  them emphasize that 
what is being exchanged is ultimately not the 
money or the thing, but ineffable, culturally 
specific qualities such as fame or dependency 
that can only take form in material ways. 
Strikingly, Retsikas turns this conversation in a 
new direction, towards solicitation. Rather than 
consider loss an expression of  generosity or 
crime, Retsikas asks us to consider the 
solicitation side of  the exchange process, one in 
which taking is legitimate. More than elicitation, 
that which is taken is already prefigured as 
rightfully the recipient's, it simply has to be 
taken to make it so, by force if  necessary. When 
affluent people neglect to pay their zakat, those 
who are due it are entitled to claim it without 
further permission. This involves a conception 
of  rights that are less connected to neoliberal 
ideas of  the individual and are more connected 
to cosmic ideas of  justice. Once the property is 
claimed in this way, it is purified of  the self-
interest that may have tainted it to begin with.  
Central to this framing is secrecy. By 
forcefully taking that which is due, the taker 
denies the giver the privilege of  charity, as 
charity would require humility and gratitude 
from the recipient and would ultimately 
compensate the first owner of  the object with 
moral superiority. The taker incites action, 
claiming not only the wealth but also the stage, by 
being the first to act. Derrida's description of  a 
universal giving subject, Retsikas says, is helpful 
but limited, because it evokes a ‘self-disciplining 
and self-effacing subject, who values the aesthetics 
of  humility and modesty, and is in total control of  
bodily and mental functions’ (page 8). Instead, 
Retsikas argues, taking as involuntary zakat is 
violent but not immoral. It stands outside of  
the moral precisely because the taker's identity 
remains unknown. ‘As the very force that 
generates the social, this violence…simply 
is’ (page 6). 
To describe zakat as requiring acclaim, 
humility, and gratitude captures one of  the 
many ways in which Retsikas's examples are 
distinctively Javanese. The scholarship on power, 
etiquette and culture in Java repeatedly reminds 
us of  the inverse relationship between public 
displays of  humility and political authority (e.g., 
Brenner 1998). To non-Javanese, these 
performances of  simplicity fly in the face of  
Western norms of  blustery proclamations to 
power (cf. Anderson 1990). To take Retsikas's 
claim to its logical conclusion, the ultimate 
power is invisible. Only a person who is 
unknown can fully possess it.  
This suggestion merits further con-
textualization in the recent history of  
Indonesian public culture. There is no doubt 
that the recent forms of  Islamic piety that have 
been most striking, to analysts and to Indonesians 
themselves, have been public. Charismatic 
authority and celebrity are ubiquitous. Islamic 
piety has been commodified, advertised, and 
circulated in ways that appear to be primarily 
about display and public recognition. However, 
acknowledging the public face of  piety only gets 
us half  the story. As Retsikas observes, the public 
form generates suspicion about the invisible form. 
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In this sense, I find the claim that the secrecy of  
taking zakat (which is actually different from 
soliciting, which is performative and public) 
positions it outside of  the social to be provocative 
and in contrast to much of  the recent research on 
Indonesian cultural politics. This literature has 
focused on the Suharto regime's legacy of  secrecy 
and a popular desire for transparency. James 
Siegel's work (also in conversation with Derrida) 
repeatedly reminds us that the Suharto state ruled 
not simply as an oppressive power but as a 
constituency competing with the citizenry for 
control over unknowable, unseeable forces. The 
ability to ‘name’ a criminal placed the state or the 
citizen in a position of  authority. These 
conditions have been linked to the desire for the 
clarity that Islamic piety can provide, especially in 
terms of  political expression (Brenner 1996; 
Hefner 2000). Aesthetically, too, these conditions 
have made for profound anxiety and curiosity 
about the sociality of  the invisible. Nils Bubandt 
has described these conditions as ‘murky’, 
producing a fascination with true and false 
documents (2008). Karen Strassler has described 
popular photography as alluring because it might 
capture a truth that the eye could not see and in 
the process produce justice (2010). Patricia Spyer 
has argued that the unpredictable nature of  
violence during the recent war in Ambon made 
visibility even more appealing, generating a form 
of  public art that was created to be seen by 
humans and by deities (2013). Mary Steedly has 
linked the public appetite for horror films in 
Indonesia after Suharto's resignation to a public 
curiosity about state violence (2013). These 
scholars build on research that traces a respect for 
and credibility in the invisible to colonial and 
even pre-colonial ideas. For example, Margaret 
Wiener beautifully conveys the fundamental 
contradiction in worlds between Dutch colonial 
officials and Balinese subjects: the former 
believed the world was as they saw it, the latter 
knew there was an entire invisible world full of  
intrigue, personalities and complexity (1995). The 
tension in these worldviews led to violence. 
Each of  these cases suggests that violence, 
invisibility and secrecy are fundamentally social. 
Although violence may ground the social claims 
to contract or indebtedness (page 13), I would 
argue that it is also thoroughly social. Rather 
than existing prior to the social or even political 
moment, the permanent threat of  violence is 
certainly frightening, and after it happens, it is 
interpreted. Sometimes that interpretation 
figures violence as pre-social, and if  so, that is 
compel l ing, but i t i s nonethe le s s an 
interpretation that comes out of  a particular 
context. Indeed, many of  these examples 
suggest that Indonesians themselves are coming 
up with ways to understand violence as 
immoral. Retsikas does us a service by pointing 
out how forced zakat can ‘affirm’ rather than 
negate violence (page 5), but even affirmation is 
more than suggesting that violence simply exists. 
It is a judgment, one based on moral claims of  
membership among the deserving poor. If  a 
claim to zakat is denied, by claiming that a taker 
is actually a criminal, that is also a moral 
position. In pointing us to debates about how to 
see the secret world through the lens of  those 
who feel they have no choice but to take, this 
essay expands our conversation to include the 
side of  the gift that has, perhaps intentionally, 
been invisible. 
University of  Colorado, Boulder 
United States 
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      hat norms undergird property rights? Under 
what conditions might one exercise claims to the 
property of  another? ‘The Other Side of  the 
Gift’ takes up the age-old anthropological 
question of  the gift and attempts to identify a 
perspective from which property rights are 
represented as ‘amoral’. The central argument is 
that by focusing not on giving, but on the receipt 
of  the gift (which is referred to both as soliciting 
and taking), Retsikas ‘describes a mode of  
violence that precedes the moral, the legal and 
the contractual’. In so doing, Retsikas suggests 
that he is making an intervention into social 
theory by recouping a previously un-
acknowledged agency of  the recipient, writing ‘I 
too proceed to recast the so-called gift-receiver 
from passive into active figure; however I also 
venture further afield by explicitly considering 
the gift from the vantage point of  soliciting, 
itself  a desire-driven activity which almost 
amounts to stealing and yet manages to 
successfully sidestep the law and its negative 
consequences’. The attempt to recoup docile 
agency recalls recent work on Islam by Saba 
Mahmood (2005:15). But, as I understand it, the 
intended intervention is two-fold, not only to 
draw attention to the agency of  the recipient, 
but also to identify a space from which property 
rights are seen as not immoral or moral, but 
amoral. 
While the essay makes some interesting 
claims, I wonder if  the central argument about 
the amorality of  soliciting is confirmed by the 
ethnographic evidence presented. Furthermore, 
this contention converges with the arguments of  
liberal economists who have sought, since the 
eighteenth century, to represent exchanges and 
the market at large in amoral terms. Retsikas 
asserts that ‘an expansive body of  anthro-
pological work on the gift, reciprocity and 
charity is similarly pervaded by moral concerns 
and quests. And yet one cannot escape 
wondering what the anthropology of  the gift 
would be like if  it had not been written from the 
perspective of  a morally charged giving, but 
rather from the perspective of  an amoral 
soliciting?’ From whence is such wonder indeed 
generated?  
In claiming that the exchanges he observes 
in contemporary Indonesia are ‘amoral’, 
Retsikas’s central contention mirrors that of  
liberal and neoliberal economists who have 
contended that market exchanges can be 
cleaved from social ones. To cite just one 
example, Michel Foucault traces this abandon-
ment to the origins of  liberalism, and the early 
liberal efforts to reconceptualise the relationship 
between the market and the state. In his 1979 
College de France lectures ‘The Birth of  
Biopolitics’, Foucault argues that prior to the 
eighteenth century the main problem faced by 
the early modern state with regard to the market 
is the administration of  justice (Foucault 2008: 
30). The state must ensure that values are 
negotiated justly, and thus the market is the site 
of  regulation where the state must ensure that 
the prices charged are just and that buyers are 
protected from possibly fraudulent sellers 
purveying shoddy goods, such as old flour or 
rotten milk. However, by the eighteenth century 
liberal political economists reconceptualise the 
market as a site not where the morality of  prices 
and goods must be regulated, but rather as a 
means for the determination of  truth, or what 
Foucault terms ‘a site of  veridiction’ (32-33). In 
other words, the role of  the state in ensuring the 
morality of  the market is abandoned in favour 
of  allowing the market to function in such a way 
that natural prices are revealed that are free of  
state interference. 
Retsikas associates the ‘perspective of  
morally charged giving’ with the work of  James 
Scott in a discussion that is curiously reduced to 
a footnote. The trouble with this claim is that in 
his classic work, The Moral Economy of  the Peasant 
(1978), Scott does not write from a moral 
perspective, but rather claims that social 
relations prior to the hegemony of  colonial 
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capitalism are undergirded by an implicit 
exchange. Moral norms are not a lens through 
which Southeast Asian societies are viewed, but 
the very objects that enables their coherence. 
Thus, Scott does not argue that the moral 
economy is morally superior to the colonial 
capitalism that eventually displaces it, but rather 
that it hangs together due to a shared set of  
moral understandings that bind people together 
in spite of  material inequalities. The key point 
here is that Scott is not passing a moral 
judgement or projecting ‘moral concerns’ onto 
the economic exchanges that organize Southeast 
Asian societies prior to the colonial onslaught, as 
Retsikas suggests, but is rather showing how 
these societies maintain their integrity based on 
the moral understandings of  the subjects who 
occupy them. 
The dismissal of  Scott’s argument about the 
centrality of  moral economies to Southeast 
Asian societies is far too cursory to be relegated 
to a mere footnote. A key text in the Maussian 
tradition, Retsikas claims that Scott’s arguments 
have been ‘rightly critiqued … for their 
ideological basis’, but then provides no citations 
to specify exactly what critiques are being 
invoked. One wonders if  this is a simple 
oversight.  
In spite of  the claims to the deconstructive 
force of  solicitation as a concept, a liberal 
conception of  property rights is evident in the 
analysis. It is critical to keep in mind that such a 
notion is still foreign to the everyday practices of  
vast numbers of  Southeast Asians today. In 
Scott’s formulation the recipient (or solicitor to 
use Retsikas’ preferred term) in a moral 
economy is not ‘taking’, but simply accessing 
goods to which they are rightfully entitled by 
virtue of  the previously existing inequality 
between giver and receiver. It is a radically 
different conception of  property rights and 
entitlements that does not conform to liberal 
norms. 
The moral economy which frames the 
exchanges invoked by Retsikas is strikingly 
apparent in the story of  the stolen laptop, which 
serves as the primary ethnographic evidence in 
the essay. The puzzle Retsikas seeks to explain is 
why his Indonesian interlocutors are not 
bothered by the stolen laptop. But the 
ethnography suggests that the street vendor with 
whom Retsikas discusses the laptop incident sees 
it not as a theft, but rather that the person who 
took the laptop was entitled to it, due primarily 
to the disproportionate differences in the 
material well-being of  the haji from whom it 
was taken and the young man who works on the 
haji’s security staff. Indeed, the street vendor 
Retsikas consults about the theft does not 
represent it as a violation of  liberal property 
rights, but, not surprisingly, in terms of  a moral 
economy: a tithe (zakat) to which the young man 
was entitled. As Retiskas puts it, ‘the laptop’s 
rightful owner was not the haji but the person 
entitled to the haji’s zakat’. This is precisely the 
way in which property rights are conceived in 
Scott’s version of  the moral economy: the taker 
is (a) entitled to the laptop, is (b) not a thief, and 
is therefore (c) committing no violation or 
violence. Indeed, the ethnography suggests that 
the haji himself  acknowledges this fact insofar as 
the disappearance of  the laptop ‘was quickly 
forgotten and was never mentioned again either 
by the haji or his family’. The haji himself  seems 
to recognize the justice of  the ‘theft’. To return 
to my a rgument , one on ly s ee s the 
disappearance of  the laptop as ‘taking’ or ‘theft’ 
and thus violating the limits of  moral order if  
one has a fundamentally liberal view of  
property rights. From the perspective of  the 
Indonesian interlocutors it appears as it if  is part 
of  a moral economy in which the poor are 
entitled to the surplus wealth of  patrons.  
If  Scott’s argument were seriously addressed 
Retsikas might modify the reach of  his 
argument and perhaps aspire to less totalizing 
theoretical claims. For example, he concludes 
‘Enforcing the right to zakat … rests on taking. 
Such taking neither succeeds giving, nor does it 
presuppose presenting. It is neither equivalent to 
receiving, nor does it assume formal accepting. 
In most general terms, it amounts to a value 
transfer accomplished by means of  craftiness, 
shrewdness and concealment’. However, from 
the perspective of  those within a non-liberal 
moral economy, the right to zakat is neither 
crafty, nor shrewd, nor concealed. It is an 
obligation on the part of  patrons to which 
clients are morally entitled. As the street 
vendor’s account of  the disappearance of  the 
laptop demonstrates, subalterns are not 
expected to make formal acceptance because 
they are merely appropriating what is due to 
them. 
The opening vignette of  Retsikas essay 
depicts familiar conversations during Ramadan 
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in which ‘the good people of  the middle class’ 
dismiss beggars as ‘professionals’ who are not 
entitled to the charity they solicit. To no great 
surprise, these members of  the urban middle 
class couch their criticisms in decidedly liberal 
terms. They see these beggars as ‘lazy and 
indolent’, ignorant of  the ‘value of  work’, and 
lacking in individual responsibility for their 
economic predicament. Rather than being 
sincere in their piety, they are represented as 
conniving and seen as using deceit to obtain 
what is rightfully the property of  others. It is no 
shock that liberal values are in widespread 
evidence among some sections of  Indonesia’s 
urban middle classes. This is precisely the 
population that is perhaps most removed from 
the moral economies that pervade the 
Indonesian countryside, living in the relative 
anonymity and modern socialities of  the city, 
where a distinctive order of  individual rights 
and obligations prevails. In the absence of  a 
duty to aid the less fortunate, these members of  
the middle class can cloak their failure to give in 
a baldly liberal language of  work, property 
rights, and truth. Just as Foucault observed in 
the liberal reformation of  the problem of  the 
market from one of  justice to one of  truth, these 
members of  the Indonesian urban middle class 
do not see redistribution in terms of  justice, but 
rather in terms of  truth. Hence their contention 
that the ‘professional beggars’ are only 
‘pretending to be destitute and poor’. This is 
how members of  the middle class judge the 
truth of  poverty. Shorn of  their responsibilities 
in a moral economy, liberalism frees the middle 
class to make its own judgement regarding the 
veracity of  need and its own obligations to the 
less fortunate that surround them.  
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      onstantinos Retsikas has written an inspiring 
and provocative contribution to the long-
standing debate about the nature of  the gift and 
its role in the constitution of  the social. My 
comments aim at contrasting my own 
conceptions of  the gift with those of  Retsikas, 
not in order to refute his argument, but in order 
to highlight some of  its hidden features. I do so, 
I hope, in the same spirit that Retsikas has 
written his paper, in order to reveal some of  its 
gaps and unspoken assumptions.  
Retsikas argues that most conceptions of  the 
gift, starting with Mauss’ masterly essay, focus on 
the donor, constructed as both agentive and 
generous. In contrast, Retsikas proposes to focus 
on the recipient as agent. This focus on 
solicitation, however, is not really what is new 
about Retsikas’ argument. It has been explored in 
particular in regard to demand sharing and 
animist hunting. In accounts like those of  
Nadasdy (2007) and Willerslev (2007), hunters 
solicit the gifts of  life and bodies of  the game 
animals by elaborate techniques of  seduction, 
pleading, and even cheating. The violence that 
Retsikas identifies in solicitation is thoroughly 
apparent in these contexts. The debates on the 
similarities and differences between sharing and 
gifting notwithstanding, the predatory imagery 
embedded in the Trobriand spells demonstrates 
how these forms of  transfer are related.  
What is new about Retsikas’ argument is his 
point that the solicitor remains anonymous – and 
that this anonymity figures as an important 
function of  the gift. This radicalizes the notion of  
soliciting by adding the secrecy of  the taking, 
which goes beyond the animist hunter’s attempts 
to seduce his prey. Retsikas indeed identifies an 
unacknowledged dimension of  the gift, but his 
argument implies certain assumptions that are in 
need of  closer scrutiny.  
Retsikas sets up his point as a reversal of  
Derrida’s critique of  the gift, by pointing out that 
Derrida assumes an agentive, self-disciplining 
donor. In contrast, Retsikas puts the anonymous 
taker – who might unconsciously be acting upon 
God’s will – center stage. Derrida, according to 
Retsikas, argues that the alterity of  the recipient is 
denied if  the gift is recognized as such, rendering 
him a derivative, inferior being.  
However, this argument assumes that a single 
transfer of  a gift can be isolated from other such 
transfers, similar to the way modern economical 
theory derives its models of  human nature from 
single, finite transactions between bounded 
parties. But the gift raised Mauss’ interest for the 
very fact that each transaction appears as part of  
a circulation that creates a – however unstable 
and negotiable – social whole, just as it creates the 
persons enacting it. Thus, the giver of  a gift must 
by necessity have been the receiver of  other gifts 
before – and is therefore in the same situation of  
de-subjectification as any other recipient. 
Derrida’s construction of  gifts seems to deny their 
circulation, by searching for the condition of  an 
isolated, ‘primordial’ gift.  
Retsikas follows Derrida insofar he assumes 
that the gift is only possible if  it is not recognized 
as such, i.e. does not create lasting obligations – 
as if  lasting obligations were something 
detrimental to the individual. While Derrida puts 
the responsibility for the invisibility of  the gift 
upon the donor, Retsikas suggests that it is far 
more obvious to seek the anonymity in the taker. 
Making the choice between donor and taker a 
crucial one in the argument, however, means to 
stress personal agency over social relationality. 
Also, this raises the question of  what the 
conditions are for a social situation in which 
takers can legitimately become invisible.  
Let me begin with the notion of  morality in 
Retsikas’ text. Retsikas states that ‘[s]oliciting [is] 
a practice unburdened by moral questions’. Here, 
as in other formulations, morality seems to be 
situated within the actors who are making 
decisions regarding the good and the bad. But 
there is another notion of  morality, one closer to 
Mauss, in which the term implies the heeding of  
shared values and long-lasting relationships. In 
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this sense, as Retsikas demonstrates, solicitation 
only works by appealing to morality. In the case 
of  Java, the long-lasting relationship is with God 
whose laws allocate shares of  wealth across a 
community composed of  the poor and the rich 
alike. As Retsikas points out, taking might be 
illegal but legitimate, revealing the difference 
between two levels of  the overall sociality: one of  
human laws, in which anonymous taking is theft; 
and a cosmological level, on which it is, under 
certain conditions, the realization of  God’s will, 
as the highest value of  the community. But, as 
Bathurst (2009) has argued, even fairly small-scale 
societies with a strong sense of  equality might 
consider stealing to be a means of  redistributing 
wealth and leveling inequalities, without the 
involvement of  cosmology.  
Soliciting thus follows from a sense that those 
who are able to give are obliged to do so. What is 
this obligation derived from? Two possible 
answers occur to me. The first is an individualist 
one: Whoever has needs has a right to satisfy 
them, by taking from whatever source. This 
would basically lead back to economist 
universalism, based on the needy individual. The 
other answer is relational: Because the haves and 
the have-nots are unequal, but still tied to each 
other, solicitation might be successful, and even 
anonymous taking appears as legitimate. In this 
sense, solicitation is not irreducible – it not only 
assumes a gift not given, but also follows from an 
existing relationship. This we might tentatively 
call community, social whole or socio-cosmic 
order, if  these terms would not suggest a 
boundedness and orderliness which does not 
resonate well with the emergent, constantly 
shifting character of  both the social and the gift.  
This also suggests a distinction between types 
of  violence, as, otherwise, there would be no 
distinction between legitimate taking and theft. 
The public debate in Java about the legitimacy of  
demanding zakat (which I wish Retsikas had come 
back to) clearly shows that Javanese do make a 
difference – first, one between illegitimate thieves 
and solicitors of  gifts, and second, between 
legitimate and illegitimate soliciting. Soliciting 
zakat is fine when done by unfortunate and poor 
city dwellers, but illegitimate when done by lazy 
country people. Both these distinctions stress the 
moral nature of  soliciting – otherwise, there 
would be no debate. 
This ultimately brings us back to Mauss. 
‘The Gift’ has been sometimes read from a pers-
pective stressing reciprocity, focusing on the 
obligation to repay, and Retsikas is right when he 
argues that this is not the most satisfactory 
interpretation of  the text. In fact, Mauss’ essay 
can be understood as the story of  how 
permanent giving that creates the social becomes 
reduced to individual contracts which formalize 
reciprocity.  
Another approach has been to focus on the 
circularity of  acts of  giving and taking. In this 
view, no single act of  giving can be isolated from 
a larger process of  social (re)production. This 
seems to be one of  the clues to the Javanese 
situation. In a reciprocity model, the recipient of  
zakat would be outside the sphere of  the gift, as s/
he is unable to reciprocate. But a more circular 
(or spiral) image of  the social becomes apparent 
when God as encompassing value comes into 
play. Ultimately, it is God who balances giving 
and receiving, by punishing the stingy and 
promoting the generous. The anonymity of  the 
legitimate, but illegal taker of  the gift is only 
assured by the fact that s/he is performing God’s 
will, who is the real exchange partner. The 
legitimate solicitor remains anonymous only in 
the sense that s/he is not identifiable as a person 
– and here, Retsikas indeed formulates an 
exciting challenge to theories which derive 
personhood from exchange. Yet, the solicitor 
remains invisible because s/he is hiding behind 
something else – his/her invisibility renders 
visible the central values of  the social.  
We are thus not finished with reading Mauss. 
Mauss indeed highlights generosity, thereby 
drawing attention to the agency of  the giver. But 
generosity is not his paramount point, even 
though in the final chapter of  his essay, he calls 
for this virtue in his current time. But a focus on 
either the donor or the recipient likewise reduces 
the complexity of  Mauss’ argument. While action 
and agency are crucial for him, they are always 
complemented with a more expansive, emergent 
sociality. As he explicitly states it, generosity and 
self-interest are indivisible in the gift, and so, by 
consequence, are individual agency and the 
emergence of  the social. This, not a rather 
European alternative of  altruism and egoism, is 
the real challenge of  the gift.  
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    he current paper corresponds to the third and 
final part of  a trilogy of  studies on zakat, the 
Islamic wealth transfer, as it is conceptualised 
and enacted in contemporary Indonesia. The 
first study explored major shifts in Indonesian 
jurisprudential discourses concerning zakat over 
a period covering roughly the past fifty years 
(Retsikas 2014). There I noted that recent efforts 
on the part of  Islamic figures, and certain 
national institutions, to make zakat transfers 
equivalent to philanthropic giving have failed to 
come to terms with legal descriptions of  zakat as 
inter alia the right of  the destitute and the poor 
(hak fakir miskin). The second study (Retsikas 
2015) explored other significant processes, 
currently under way, of  turning zakat into both a 
financial asset and a debt-based instrument for 
purposes of  community development projects 
that are also shariah-compliant. In particular, the 
second article looked into a series of  legal, 
pedagogical, and organisational innovations that 
were developed in the 2000s and early 2010s, 
and which have sanctioned the deployment of  
zakat as a commodity in asymmetrical 
transactions involving civil society institutions 
and the urban poor.  
The current article brings this exploration to 
an end-point, which is also a new beginning. By 
explicitly disclaiming zakat as either equivalent 
to ‘gifts’, or as comparable to ‘commodities’, it 
opens up the practice of  zakat to an alternative, 
‘deconstructive’ reading—thereby effectively 
foregrounding zakat as an excessive ‘sign’, 
endowed with a surplus of  meaning, and 
untapped political and ethical potential. My 
discontent over contemporary Indonesian 
‘renditions’ of  zakat has, in other words, led me 
to look for the ‘untamed’, the residue that 
discourse always leaves behind. Moreover, by 
placing zakat at the centre of  analysis, my aim is 
to make the case for a new way of  
conceptualizing (and valuing) value transfers. The 
residue in question is the subject matter of  the 
current article and relates to acts of  soliciting—
i.e. performances in which transactions are 
accomplished without the promise or 
expectation of  a return, whereby the en-
forcement of  one’s property rights requires 
concealment and anonymity. The solicitors, 
whom my ethnography makes manifest, take 
without stealing or recompensing, ‘interpreting’ 
the (human) law by means of  constantly testing 
its limits, illuminating its breaking points, and 
shaking its foundations from within.  
As well as ‘undoing’ current Indonesian 
experiments with philanthropy and micro-
finance, these Javanese solicitors also upset key 
social scientific theories of  value. The latter are 
at the heart of  the commentaries provided by 
Sprenger and Rudnyckyj, which are concerned 
with the relation of  value (morality) to values 
(the economy), the supposed morality of  gift-
exchange and the alleged immorality of  the 
market. In reply I should begin by clarifying my 
overall position, in order to avoid mis-
understanding. My point of  departure is this: 
Despite their ostensibly critical inclination, both 
Marx (2010) and Mauss (2011) remain shackled 
to a contractarian model of  the social that is at 
least as old as Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s treatises 
on the subject. Whether in the form of  a 
counter-gift, or as wages paid for labour-time 
expended, the idea of  reciprocity remains for them 
a key presupposition. The postulate of  a 
commensurate return amounts to an uncritically 
adopted theoretical and moral foundation. The 
honouring of  contracts, and the honour of  
being contracted, are taken to be of  utmost 
importance—both ethically and conceptually. 
Moreover, in the case of  Marx, the equivalence 
of  giving and taking is deployed as a meta-value in 
terms of  which he conducts his evaluation of  
capitalism as exploitative. However, the 
overwhelming difficulty we face is that 
contractarian assumptions are found at the heart 
of  capitalism itself, with the market furnishing 
the required mechanism for eliciting returns and 
adjudicating equivalences. Moreover, exponents 
of  the market through the ages – from Adam 
Smith (1976) to Milton Friedman (1962) – 
conceive of  it as a moral arena essential for the 
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pursuit and realisation of  human values—such 
as those of  propriety, sympathy, and mutuality, 
as well as of  freedom, choice, and agency. 
Where does this leave us?  
For one thing, and always anthropologically 
speaking, a failure to take the natives’ 
perspective seriously (as Rudnyckyj implies) 
would be a gross mistake for any ethnography 
of  modernity. In this regard it is important to 
note that in liberal and neo-liberal approaches, 
the market is primarily conceived as means to 
an end, a ‘thing’ that is not valued or important 
in itself, but is useful for the realisation of  an 
ultimate, ‘priceless’ value. The institutional 
‘disembedding’ of  the market and its ‘lifting’ 
above all other social relations is motivated by 
ethical considerations: It serves to cultivate and 
promote ‘universal’ human qualities of  
individuality, creativity, and autonomy. This line 
of  reasoning raises important questions with 
respect to the so-called ‘moral economy’ 
approach as well. To rephrase a point already 
made in the essay itself, James Scott’s The Moral 
Economy of  the Peasant (1976) is neither part of  the 
Maussian tradition, nor is it part of  the Marxian 
tradition, and this because it posits security as the 
paramount value. Scott’s book begins with the 
question of  security—namely, what are the 
conditions of  possibility for peasant revolt? And 
he locates the answer in subsistence security 
ethics—i.e. peasant arrangements revolving 
around patron-client relations that presumably 
ensure that everyone has enough to eat in 
return for staying tame. The very same value 
pervades a burgeoning literature on Islam in 
anthropology, which sets out to test the 
‘compatibility’ of  Islam and democracy, the 
market, human rights, modernity, etc.  
The approach I have taken, both in this 
study and more generally, is inspired by one of  
the greatest auto-ethnographic texts of  the 19th 
century, Nietzsche’s (2003) The Genealogy of  
Morals. The philosopher’s maxim of  the trans-
valuation of  all values, inclusive of  the will-to-
truth, the will-to-knowledge, and the will-to-
good, forms a most significant counterpoint to 
the contractarian model because it provides a 
critique of  exchange. This is the call to which 
Derrida responds; following him, I do too. In 
this context, soliciting signifies counter-values as 
much as the return of  the ‘un-tamed’. Such 
return does not reproduce sociality through 
exchange, but dislodges our expectations of  the 
normal, disturbing the rhythms of  anticipation 
coded in contracts. In embodying such a 
critique, and revaluating our values, the act of  
soliciting demands of  its practitioners that they 
remain anonymous. As Sprenger notes, 
anonymity is of  central importance for my 
argument precisely because it foregrounds an 
unconventional conception of  the subject. To 
the extent that the value of  critique is as good as 
the alternatives it opens up, solicitors are to be 
thought of  as future-subjects, the people-to-
come. What this means is, first, that the subject 
positions signified by solicitors are beyond the 
identitarian projects of  late modernity with their 
politics of  state recognition. In desiring 
obscurity over and above sovereign protection, 
solicitors manifest the positive side of  
concealment. In this regard, Jones is right to 
point out that Indonesia is a country that has 
long suffered from projects of  political 
domination that involve an unholy mix of  
disguise, cover-up and suppression. Writing with 
respect to the infamous ninja killings of  East 
Java that took place after Suharto’s fall from 
power in 1998, I myself  brought attention to the 
intimate connection between practices of  
concealment and political violence (2006). 
However, there is more to concealment than 
meets the eye (so to speak); the current article 
attempts to make this explicit. Let me put it this 
way: Solicitors’ practices of  anonymity are 
important because they pose a profound 
challenge to anthropology. An anthropology in 
which descriptions and concepts are meant to 
classify and identify – to name and to designate, 
to make the other the object of  knowledge – is 
an anthropology that has yet to leave its 
birthplace. An aporetic anthropology, by 
contrast, is a traveling one: It affirms the alterity 
of  both the other, and of  the future, by refusing 
to objectify—by placing chance and uncertainty 
– the unknown – at the heart of  its project. 
Soliciting is a by-word for such an aporetic 
anthropology. 
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